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1. Introduction 
 
In September 2014, al-Qaeda Central (AQC) launched its latest regional affiliate, al-
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), building on the already existing affiliates such 
as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
or Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) in Syria. The new group was created to operate across South 
Asia, however, with its centre of gravity and leadership based in Pakistan. It was formed 
through the amalgamation of numerous pre-existing al-Qaeda associated regional and 
local groups.  
 
The creation of this new al-Qaeda affiliate followed soon after the formal split between 
AQC and ISIS, with the latter’s declaration of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq and seemingly 
threatening to replace AQC as the leader of the global jihad. Timing which led many to 
perceive the creation of AQIS as merely a reaction to these events and an attempt to 
regain the initiative by AQC. As a result of the split, both AQC and ISIS started to 
compete for influence and the loyalty of Jihadist groups across the globe, which would 
in due course also reach South Asia. 
 
This paper is a background brief, designed for policy makers, to shed light on and 
increase understanding of AQC’s latest affiliate AQIS. This paper starts with outlining 
what AQIS is, which groups it was created from and who its leaders are. Second, the 
reasons for the creation of AQIS are explored. Third, AQIS’s narrative is dissected and 
examined. Fourth, the group’s operational strategy, through the terrorist attacks 
carried out by AQIS since its formation, are investigated. Finally, the rivalry between ISIS 
and AQIS in South Asia is addressed, before concluding with an analyses of the future 
prospects of AQIS. 
 
 
2. Who is AQIS? 
 
According to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s announcement of the formation of 
AQIS, it was the product of more than two years’ work in recruiting fighters and uniting 
different pre-existing Jihadi groups in the Indian Subcontinent.1 As explained in the first 
edition of al Qaeda’s magazine Resurgence 2, “[t]he establishment of this organization is 
a direct result of the merger of several groups that have been engaged in Jihad in this 
region for several years. In guidance of their Ameer, Shaykh Ayman al Zawahiri, the 
leaders of these Jihadi groups have joined forces to coalesce into a single organisation, 
Jama’ah Qa’eda al jihad in the Subcontinent.” 3 However, exactly which Jihadi groups 
have been merged to form AQIS, has never been confirmed by the group. The topic is 
subject to some debate among analysts and below is a list of groups compiled from 
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different sources, elements of which are thought likely to have been included in the 
formation of AQIS:4 
 
o Afghan Taliban (Afghanistan) 
o Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Pakistan) 
o Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) (Bangladesh and Pakistan) 
o Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) (disputed Kashmir region) 
o Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al Almi (HuMA) (Pakistan) 
o Brigade 313 (Pakistan) 
o Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) (Pakistan) 
o Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (Pakistan) 
o Jundullah (Pakistan) 
o Ansar ut-Tawhid wa al Jihad in Kashmir (disputed Kashmir region) 
o Ansar al Islam Bangladesh (Bangladesh) 
o Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) (Bangladesh) 
o Indian Mujahideen (IM) (India) 
o Lanshkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Pakistan) 
o Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Pakistan) 
o Turkistan Islamic Party (Paskistan) 
 
 
3. AQIS Leadership 
 
With the formation of AQIS, al-Zawahiri named Asim Umar the Emir of al Qaeda’s latest 
affiliate. A trained theologian and Pakistani native, Asim is known as a skilled orator 
who previously taught at a madrassa in Karachi and has written four books promoting 
Jihad.5 He has been associated with a number of Jihadi groups including Harkat-ul-Jihad 
al-Islami (HUJI)6 and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and was a former commander in the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).7 Before going onto become a trusted lieutenant of al-
Qaeda, and rose to be the group’s “internet propagandist and also head of Al Qaeda’s 
Sharia committee for Pakistan” before being appointed Emir of AQIS.8 
 
The choice of Asim marks a change from al-Qaeda predilection for choosing Arab 
leaders, and it shows a clear strategic vision to choose a leader that is both well-known 
al Qaeda Central (AQC) but also well-connected to Jihadi groups across South Asia. As 
Abdul Basit notes, “[t]he emergence of AQIS and the appointment of a Pakistani jihadist 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
leader with anti-India credentials indicates that Al Qaeda wants to cement its place in 
the region on a long-term basis”.9 
 
In addition, Ahmad Farouq was appointed as deputy-emir. He was previously al Qaeda’s 
head of preaching and media in Pakistan. Although AQIS has claimed he is from 
Pakistan, the U.S. have also stated that he was an American citizen. However Farouq 
was subsequently killed by a U.S. drone strike on 15 January 2015 in North Waziristan, 
Pakistan.10 Since its formation the leadership of AQIS have been consistently targeted 
by the US – less than half a year after AQIS’ formation, five senior leaders had been 
killed by the US, either by drone strikes or by US forces in al-Qaeda’s Afghan/Pakistan 
border regions.11 
 
 
4. The Rationale for the Creation of AQIS 
 
The dominant initial interpretation by the media and security analysts of the 
announcement of the formation of AQIS, was that this was an attempt to regain the 
initiative from ISIS, after the latter began to challenge al-Qaeda as the leaders of the 
worldwide jihadi movement, following their announcement of the formation of the 
caliphate two months earlier.12 However, there is a debate over reasons behind AQIS 
formation, was it simply a reaction to ISIS? 
 
In a special addition of the Resurgence magazine published in Summer 2015, almost a 
year after the announcement of the formation of AQIS, Adam Yahiye Gadahn 13 
answered accusations that the announcement had been contrived as an attempt to 
take back the initiative from ISIS. Rejecting this, Gadahn claims that the project was:  
 
spread out over a period of years and months. And I know for a fact that the 
actual formation of the branch was finalized in mid-2013, i.e. well before the 
break with the Iraqi branch. So the founding of the new branch had 
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absolutely nothing to do with any perceived or presumed rivalry between al-
Qaeda and Islamic State.14  
 
Similarly, security analyst Shreya Das argues that the process was set in motion before 
the rise of ISIS, but also that this was not the first time al-Qaeda had attempted to open 
a South-Asian branch, with a previous effort failing after the killing of senior operative 
IIyas Kashmiri in a U.S. drone strike in 2011.15 However, as Das points out, by lending 
the new branch the al-Qaeda brand name, this immediately put the new group in the 
front line of the war on terror, arguing that “[t]he interests of the group may have been 
better served by adopting a more innocuous name, which would allow it to fly under 
the radar and consolidate its position, while avoiding excess scrutiny”, and suggesting 
that “public image and bolstering the al-Qaeda global brand” may have been important 
reasons for the formation of AQIS.16 
 
An alternative narrative regarding the formation of AQIS, is that it is driven by a long-
term strategic re-adjustment to the drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan. In 
an article Resurgence in Fall 2014, Hassan Yusuf explains that the formation of AQIS 
“comes in the wake of the American defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan. … This 
Jihad will not end with the American withdrawal from Afghanistan; America’s defeat is 
only the prelude. What lies in wait for her despicable ‘allies’ (read toadies) in this region 
is yet to unfold”.17 Following this line argument, the departure of American forces would 
then free up fighters for al Qaeda allowing the re-deploying of experienced fighters to 
different fronts in South Asia.18 As such it is argued that the formation of AQIS can be 
seen as a strategic restructuring from the ‘far’ enemy, America, to the ‘near’ enemy, the 
regimes of South Asia that prevent the formation of a new caliphate -  the governments 
of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. In doing so the key driver of the Jihad in 
South Asia is changing from U.S. occupation of Afghanistan to the narrative of Ghazwa-
Al-Hind (Battle of India).19  
 
A different perspective is that the formation of AQIS is about legacy – anchoring “al-
Qaeda’s presence” in South Asia. 20  The centre of al-Qaeda’s operations and its 
leadership have been based in South Asia, in particular Afghanistan and Pakistan, for 
the last three decades. However, the geopolitics of the Global Jihad are changing. First 
the drawdown of US troops in Afghanistan removes the primary reason for Jihad in the 
region. Second, the last decade has seen the rise of powerful al-Qaeda affiliates such 
as AQAP and JAN. Raising the realistic possibility that the future leadership of AQC, if al-
Zawahiri dies or is killed, may come from one of its regional affiliates and that al-
Qaeda’s central command may move out of South Asia. Under this reading of events, 
the formation of AQIS is designed to create a structure through which al-Qaeda can 
remain operational in South Asia, even if the central command moves elsewhere.21  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
Whatever the reasons behind the creation of AQIS, it is likely to put Pakistan’s complex 
relationship with the many jihadi groups on its soil under strain. Pakistan has long 
drawn a distinction between Pakistani groups that have committed terrorists attacks 
on targets in other countries (such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)) and those that wage a 
campaign of violence against the Pakistani State (such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP)).22 The formation of AQIS brings both sides together placing this distinction under 
pressure.  As Sunil Dasgupta comments, “as the line between the two evaporates, the 
willingness and ability of the Pakistani state itself to abandon this distinction, which has 
been the source of much acrimony with Washington and New Delhi, may determine 
the future of the country”.23 
 
4.1 Connecting the Global and Local Jihad in South Asia 
 
Collectively, South Asia constitutes a Muslim population of 484 million, which together 
makes up over a third of the global Muslim community.24 Whilst AQC has been present 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, since the 1990s, what drew it there was the safe heavens 
provided by the Taliban rather than to launch Jihad across South Asia. However, it is a 
region that AQC is well imbedded in with its safe havens, and with a long history of local 
Islamist groups to which AQC is well connected.  
 
To a certain extent the creation of AQIS can be seen as the formalisation of the already 
close working relationships of the different Jihadi groups in South Asia.25 This though 
marks a major change for the region, as whilst the sub-continent has seen an extensive 
amount of Jihadi terrorism over the last few decades, most of this has been home 
grown rather than part of the global jihadi struggle. As Sunil Dasgupta comments, 
“[w]hat makes the emergence of AQIS significant, however, is that it is the first time a 
global jihadi organization has explicitly targeted governments and people in the 
region”. 26  Through the formation of AQIS, al-Qaeda is seeking to do what it has 
previously done so effectively elsewhere around the world, to combine the local 
conflicts into its global Jihad. 
 
 
5. The Narrative of AQIS 
 
Central to the formation of AQIS, was the adoption of a “narrative to underpin a long-
term Jihad in South Asia. That narrative is Ghazwa al-Hind or Battle of India, referenced 
to in a hadith or Islamic prophetic tradition”. 27  The Hadiths are the oral traditions 
attributed to the prophet Muhammad; the ones cited by al-Zawahiri prophesise the 
Muslim conquest of historic India and claims that those that take part will be rewarded 
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with their place in paradise.28 This is similar in nature to how ISIS has been successfully 
projecting the ‘apocalyptic’ nature of its vision, depicting its conflict in Syria/Iraq as the 
end of times war in the Levant, in which those who take part are rewarded with a place 
in Paradise.29  
 
The narrative of Ghazwa al-Hind has played a central role in the discourse of the sub-
continent’s Islamists ever since the emergence of jihadist attacks in Indian-controlled 
Kashmir. In fact most Pakistani-based Jihadist groups have framed their attacks on 
Indian soil as part of the ‘Battle for India’.30 However, the ‘battle for India’ is taken here 
to refer to an area far bigger than the modern day nation state of India, including the 
land today covered by Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Kashmir, Myanmar and Bangladesh 
(and more).31 AQIS has since placed the concept of Ghazwa al-Hind at the centre of their 
narrative, describing their first major attack at the Naval shipyard in Karachi in 
September 2014 as giving “a clear message to India that Ghazwa-e-Hind has only just 
begun”.32 
 
In the audio message that al-Qaeda chief al-Zawahiri released, to announce the 
formation of AQIS, he rallied against the governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
describing them as criminals, corrupt and self-serving politicians that are backed by the 
west, which has prevented them from becoming true Islamic states. As he exclaims: 
 
They claimed that they created Pakistan more than 60 years ago to defend 
Islam and Muslims in the subcontinent. Today we have a Pakistan that has 
no Shariah, no independence and no honour. Its government, army, 
intelligence, police and judiciary act as mercenaries hired to defend the 
interests of the crusader onslaught in South Asia.33 
 
Arguing the same for the creation of Bangladesh, he claims that “today we see 
Bangladesh turning into a huge prison in which the sanctities, honour, dignity and 
sacred places of Muslims are violated”.34  Stating that the real purpose of the creation 
of Bangladesh out of Pakistan was to “rip the Muslim Ummah apart” and weaken the 
Muslim Ummah in the subcontinent.35  Framing it as a situation of the Crusader West 
supporting corrupt politicians that are preventing the formation of true Islamic states.  
In which democracy is in opposition to Islam’s system of life,36 and is “a one- way 
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highway that lands you in a position where you can serve the West”.37 Arguments that 
serve to support his call for Muslims of South Asia to rise up against their corrupt 
western backed leaders and the democratic system to create an Islamic state under 
sharia: 
 
I invite you to lead the masses in a vast and inclusive popular uprising 
(intifada) whose tide does not receive, nor its dynamism subsides, until the 
Shariah of Islam governs the land of Islam, instead of being governed over; 
until it becomes the authority, instead of being subjected to 'authority'; and 
until it leads the way, instead of being led. I invite you to expose the 
deception of the democratic system in front of the masses.38 
 
In its messaging AQIS makes a special focus against India, who it sees as in alliance with 
the West against South Asia’s Muslim population. Al-Zawahiri’s called for Muslims to 
unite in “support to confront the alliance of India, the West, secularists and atheists”.39 
In this way AQIS has striven to connect the local with the global,40 seeking to conflate 
Modi’s rule in India with the Islamist global Jihad against the west. In a video release in 
May 2015 called ‘From France to Bangladesh: the Dust Will Never Settle Down”, AQIS 
pronounces that “[t]hrough the policies of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, drone attacks, Charlie Hebdo’s writings... and Narendra Modi’s 
speeches, which call for Muslims to be burnt alive — this is the same war”.41 
In doing so it seeks to capitalise on the existing cleavages in Indian society between the 
Hindu majority and the large Muslim minority, while also seeking to exploit age-old 
fears of domination and suppression of the Muslim community.  In what al-Zawahiri  
describes as our Muslim brothers “living under the dark shade of Hindu occupation”.42 
An article called “The Future of Muslims in India” in the first edition of Resurgence, claims 
that the Indian establishment is “working methodically to bring the Muslims down from 
the level of former kings and emperors to the level of Shudars, Dalits and lower castes 
so that they lose the will and strength to stand up to the Hindus”.43 
 
However, AQIS’ propaganda appears to be more than just appealing to ancient 
divisions, but rather a calculated attempt to exploit rising tensions in “India’s 
disenchanted Muslim underclass”, a large portion of whom it is argued live “inside 
ghettos, without modern education, and unable to access the emerging ‘Indian 
Dream’”.44 The key driver of these rising tensions was the election of Hindu nationalist 
Narendra Modi as prime minister of India a few months earlier in May 2014. Modi is a 
controversial figure in the Muslim community, as he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat 
State during the 2002 communal riots in which at least 1,000 people were killed, mainly 
Muslims.45 Modi’s role as Chief Minister has been plagued with accusations of failing to 
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take sufficient actions to protect the Muslim community. Despite being cleared by 
courts and investigations, many Indians are still suspicious of his handling of the riots.46  
 
Al-Zawahiri, points out the communal violence against Muslims in both Gujarat and 
Ahmadabad – in which violence broke out following the 2002 Gujarat riot - as well as 
high-lighting the ongoing conflicts in Kashmir and Assam in India. In the former where 
a Muslim insurgency is fighting for independence for the Muslim majority state from 
India, and the latter which has seen ongoing violence since the 1980s between local 
ethnic groups and Bengali speaking Muslims. Connections to these local conflicts, 
provides propaganda and potential recruiting grounds but also, in particular in 
Kashmir, access to experienced jihadi veterans.47   
 
However, many analysts argue that despite these elements, al-Qaeda has little prospect 
of being able to radicalise the Indian Muslim population – pointing out that is something 
that al-Qaeda has tried and failed to do over the last two decades.48 As Kirit Nair argues, 
“AQIS is unlikely to gain traction as India’s democratic dispensation provides Indian 
Muslims freedom, liberty and media exposure to a level unheard of in most of the 
Islamic world”.49 There is also an ideological disconnect with little support within the 
Indian Muslim population for the Wahhabi strand of Islam followed by some 
extremists, nor for the establishment of a Caliphate.50 
 
In is not just in Hindu majority India that al-Zawahiri seeks to capitalise on an aggrieved 
Muslim minority, but also in Budhist majority Myanmar, in which he highlights the 
plight of the persecuted Muslim Rohingyas.51 Their marginalisation and persecution is 
again linked to the West, pointing out how America praises the progress that the 
country has made towards democracy and on human rights, whilst the violence against 
the Muslim Rohingyas continues.52 
 
 
6. AQIS Attacks and Operational Strategy 
 
Despite AQIS’ stated vision of fighting a war for South Asia, since its formation it has 
largely failed to live up to its ambitions, unable to carry out a terrorist spectacular and 
managing only a handful of relatively minor attacks across South Asia.53 The table below 
lists all the AQIS attacks that researchers at the ICCT have been able to identify.54 Two 
of which occurred before the formation of AQIS, but have since been claimed by the 
group. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 
Date Country Fatalities Event 
2012 Pakistan 1 The Pakistani blogger Aniqa Naz was 
reportedly killed in a road accident in 
2012. However, in a video released on 
2 May 2015, AQIS claimed 
responsibility for the death of Naz.55 
15 February 
2013 
Bangladesh 1 The Bangladeshi anti-Islamist blogger 
Ahmed Rajib Haider was hacked to 
death in Dhaka, Bangladesh. 56  In a 
video released on 2 May 2015, AQIS 
claimed responsibility for the death of 
Haider.57 
2 September 
2014 
Pakistan 3 AQIS killed three people, including the 
Pakistani army officer Brigadier Fazal 
Zahoor and his brother, at a Shia 
mosque in Sargodha, Pakistan. 58 
Usama Mahmoud, the spokesman for 
AQIS, claimed responsibility for this 
attack in a statement on Twitter.59   
6 September 
2014 
Pakistan 4 AQIS boarded a Pakistani ship (PNS 
Zulfiqar) in an apparent attempt to 
launch missiles on US frigates in the 
Arabian Sea. The attack was partly 
carried out by Pakistani Navy officers 
that were recruited by AQIS. Although 
AQIS seized the warship, the attempt 
failed. 60  
In the attack three militants and one 
petty officer were killed. AQIS claimed 
responsibility in a statement on 
Twitter.61 
18 September 
2014 
Pakistan  1 The liberal Islamic scholar Dr. 
Muhammad Shakil Auj was fatally shot 
in Karachi, Pakistan. Dr. Auj had 
previously been accused of blasphemy 
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for comments during a speech.62 In a 
video that was released on 2 May 2015, 
AQIS’s leader Asim Umar claimed 
responsibility for murdering Dr. Auj.63 
15 November 
2014 
Bangladesh 1 Shafiul Islam, a Bangladeshi professor 
in sociology, was killed near Rajshahi 
University, Bangladesh. 64  In a video 
that was released on 2 May 2015, 
AQIS’s leader Asim Umar claimed 
responsibility for the murder.65 
26 February 
2015 
Bangladesh 1  The American-Bangladeshi blogger 
and activist Dr. Avijit Roy was hacked to 
death near Dhaka University, 
Bangladesh. His wife was also targeted, 
but survived. In a video that was 
released on 2 May 2015, AQIS claimed 
responsibility for the murder.66 
30 March 2015 Bangladesh 1 The blogger Oyasiqur Rahman Babu 
was killed in Dhaka, Bangladesh in a 
similar way to Avijit Roy. His attackers 
claimed to have killed him for his anti-
Islamist stances.67 Dhaka Metropolitan 
Police believe that members of the 
Ansarullah Bangla Team, an al-Qaeda 
inspired Islamic extremist group, are 
responsible for the murder.68 Again, in 
the video that was released on 2 May 
2015, AQIS claimed responsibility for 
the murder 69 
12 May 2015 Bangladesh 1 The blogger Ananta Bijoy Das was 
hacked to death near his home in 
Sylhet, Bangladesh. AQIS claimed 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
responsibility for the attack in a 
statement on Twitter.70 
7 August 2015 Bangladesh 1 The secular Bangladeshi blogger Niloy 
Neel was hacked to death in his 
apartment in Dhaka, Bangladesh. AQIS 
claimed responsibility for the 
murder.71 
31 October 
2015 
Bangladesh 1 The publisher Faisal Arefin Dipan was 
hacked to death outside his office in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh. On the same day, 
the publisher Ahmed Rahim Tutul and 
two writers were wounded in an attack 
in Dhaka, but all survived. AQIS has 
claimed responsibility for the attacks.72 
 
 
6.1 Failed Attack on Pakistani Naval Ship 
 
One attack that stands out from all the others is the AQIS attack on a Pakistani naval 
ship on 6 September 2014, the same month in which AQIS was formally launched. 
Although ultimately a failure, it was as close as AQIS has come to committing a terrorist 
spectacular.73  The alleged plan behind the attack was to hijack two Pakistani navy 
frigates and then use them to attack both the American and Indian navies. 74  In 
comparison to subsequent attacks, which have largely been individual assassinations, 
this attack required considerable planning and operational capability. Furthermore, the 
attack was carried out in part by Pakistani Naval personnel recruited by AQIS.75 The 
complexity of the attack and the infiltration of the Pakistani armed forces, raised fears 
of AQIS’s ability to launch future spectacular attacks, which have so far not materialised. 
However, the attack remains a stark reminder of the potential that AQIS harbours. 
 
This attack also highlighted a new and emerging strategy of al-Qaeda to target 
America’s control of the sea. In a press release about the Naval attack, AQIS stated that 
it had targeted the Navy since, “It is because of their Naval strength that America and 
its allies have been able to impose a military and economic stranglehold on the Muslim 
world, especially on the land of Makkah and Madinah. America’s naval-military 
capability represents the backbone of its global empire of oppression”.76 The strategy 
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was further elaborated in Resurgence magazine, in an article called ‘Targeting the 
Achilles Heel of Western Economies’, highlighting the importance of open sea lanes to 
world trade and the flow of oil to the west; pointing out that “[f]ive of the world’s most 
strategic naval chokepoints are located in the Muslim world”. 77  The attack on 6 
September was perhaps intended to be, if it had succeeded, the first step in pursuit of 
this new strategy. Demonstrating the unfulfilled ambition that saw the formation of 
AQIS and the threat it still potentially holds to the security and stability of South Asia. 
 
 
Map of Global Chokepoints: Taken from “Resurgence”, Issue 1, 2014.78 
 
6.2 Attacks on Bangladeshi Bloggers 
 
As can be seen from the table above, since November 2014 all of AQIS’s attacks have 
taken place in Bangladesh and have been small attacks targeting individuals, mainly 
bloggers. Two points can be noted; first that for the time being AQIS is incapable of 
carrying out attacks in Pakistan or India, potentially highlighting the impact that U.S. 
drone strikes in Pakistan have had on the AQIS leadership.79 Further, the attacks that 
AQIS has claimed responsibility for in Bangladesh are far from terrorist spectaculars, 
largely individual knife attacks, demonstrating their lack of sophisticated terrorist 
capabilities. However, reports following the arrest of 12 militants in Bangladesh during 
July 2015 alleged that AQIS had acquired a large amount of arms and explosives, and 
had been planning a spectacular terrorist attack in Dhaka during Ramadan80, indicating 
that it may only be a matter of time before AQIS in Bangladesh graduates to more 
sophisticated attacks. 
 
Secondly, the series of attacks in Bangladesh shows that AQIS’s reach stretches far 
outside of the al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan, demonstrating that 
there is more than just retoric to the group’s appropriation of the narrative of Ghazwa-
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
Al-Hind. In addition it shows AQIS’s ability to develop working relationships with local 
jihadi groups in South Asia, with the attacks in Bangladesh being carried out mainly by 
its local affiliate Ansar al Islam Bangladesh.81 In doing so it has successfully connected 
the global and local together, as it has done so effectively elsewhere in the world. Thus 
raising the question of what the future may hold? Will AQIS be able to successfully work 
with other local South Asian Jihadi groups, and will AQIS be able to transfer their tactical 
and operational knowledge to such groups, increasing their terrorist capabilities?   
 
6.3 Setbacks and Growths 
 
Towards the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, a series of events demonstrated 
the continued setbacks that AQIS was facing at the hands of the security services. 
However, they also served to show the latent threat that AQIS continues to present and 
the extent to which its cells have spread across the sub-continent. 
 
In October 2015, US and Afghan Forces carried out a raid on two AQIS training camps in 
the Kandahar Province of Afghanistan near the Pakistan border, during which nearly 
200 fighters were killed. One of the camps covered nearly 30 square miles with extensive 
tunnels and fortifications, which was described by military officials “as one of the largest 
ever discovered”.82 However, these are not the only camps at which al-Qaeda is now 
believed to be operating at, with further suspected al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, 
including at least one in Helmand province.83 Thus highlighting the re-emerging threat 
of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, in the wake of the US draw down and the Taliban’s increasing 
strength. The resilience of al-Qaeda appears to have caught the US off-guard while they 
were focused on confronting ISIS and a resurgent Taliban, and raises the question of 
whether the al-Qaeda training camps may once again become breeding grounds for 
attacks on the west. Former Deputy CIA Director Michael Morell commented, “It is why 
we need to worry about the resurgence of the Taliban…because, just like before, the 
Taliban will give Al Qaeda a safe haven”.84 
 
Later in December 2015, the extent of the AQIS infiltration into India became apparent 
with the arrest of three members AQIS’s Indian wing, including its leader, Mohammad 
Asif, in Delhi.85 In his interrogation it emerged that Asif had attended the grand Shura in 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Waziristan that had formally announced the formation of AQIS, during which he was 
instructed to return to India to set up terror groups in the country.86 It’s further alleged 
that IM was seeking affiliation with AQIS and assistance with IM operations in India.87 
The Delhi police later claimed that a second of the AQIS operatives arrested, Maulana 
Abdul Rehman Kasmi, had set up a terror training camp “somewhere in Jharkhand 
forests which is yet to be located”.88 Although Indian security services have so far been 
successful of countering the AQIS threat, the arrests highlights AQIS’s clear intentions. 
 
Then  on February 12, Pakistani authorities arrested 97 LeJ and AQIS militants in raids 
across the southern city of Karachi, including AQIS deputy leader Farooq Bhatti.89 The 
arrests allegedly disrupted a planned attack on Hyderbad central jail, designed to free 
100 prisoners but also to kill another 35 prisoners.90 The plan which was said to be  “90% 
ready for execution”, was to have included six suicide bombers.91 At a press conference 
following the arrests, military spokesman Lieutenant General Asim Bajwa said "Our 
conclusion is that all of the terrorist groups are trying to cooperate with each other in 
order to carry out terrorist attacks", articulating the view that AQIS, LeJ and Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were working in collusion.92 Although once again a setback for 
AQIS, it also demonstrates the continued threat the group poses, as well as its 
organizational capability and cooperation with other militant groups. 
 
 
7. ISIS vs. AQIS 
 
Whether or not the creation of AQIS was a reaction to the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, 
the rivalry between them has become one of the major dynamics to watch in South 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
Asia.93 The split between ISIS and AQC, culminating with al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the 
caliphate, resulted in tumultuous upheaval within the global Jihadi community, as the 
two sides competed for influence and followers, setting off a process in which “splits 
began within organizations, and loyalties began shifting from al-Zawahiri to Caliph al-
Baghdadi”.94 This global schism is being fought out locally, with both sides competing to 
lead the global jihad in South Asia.95 In practice South Asia is seeing the clash of three 
competing Jihadi philosophies, on the one side the al-Qaeda/Taliban alliance that 
combines al-Qaeda’s global jihad (‘think global but act local’), alongside the Taliban’s 
emirate model (‘think local and act local’), in opposition to the ISIS caliphate model (‘think 
global and act global’).96 
 
At the time of AQIS’s formation ISIS had a limited presence in South Asia. However, since  
January 2015 we have seen the formation of ISIS’s Wilayat Khorasan 97  based in 
Afghanistan, which is even alleged now to have camps across the border in Pakistan’s 
tribal areas.98 Later that year saw ISIS claim responsibility for a series of attacks in 
Bangladesh, which are suspected to have been carried out by local militants from 
Bangladeshi groups such as Jumatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh  and Ansarullah Bangla 
Team – both previously thought to be linked with AQIS.99 
 
The impact of this internal-jihadist competition in South-Asia is yet to become clear, 
although there are three potential outcomes worth highlighting. The first, that quite 
simply the emergence of ISIS in South Asia steals AQIS’s thunder, and the embryonic 
AQIS is never able to properly establish itself as it bleeds the support of its local affiliates 
to ISIS. Already the Pakistan-based Jihadi group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 
which was previously allied to the Taliban and al Qaeda, has defected to ISIS. 100 
Secondly, the rivalry between the groups leads to chaos and infighting that weakens 
both groups, and whilst they are focussed on their internal schism it diverts their 
attention from carrying out terrorist attacks. The rivalry has seen groups been torn apart 
over who they support, leading to defections and splits, such as with the Indian 
Mujahideen (IM) which has recently fractured in two, one side aligned with al-Qaeda and 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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the other ISIS.101 The third is that competition between the two groups sparks off a wave 
of terrorist attacks as each group struggles to portray themselves as relevant, and seeks 
to outbid the other in the terror stakes. In which attacks become a form of propaganda 
by deed, but aimed at their own internal audience. The great fear in this scenario, is that 
this rivalry may prove to be the catalyst to drive AQIS to carry out a terrorist spectacular 
to prove itself. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Most analysts agree that AQIS has not been able to achieve the success that AQC may 
have hoped for. It has so far failed to have launched any successful large scale terrorist 
attacks in South Asia. Although the failed attack on the Pakistani Navy on 6 September 
2014 showed both its initial ambition and operational potential to carry out 
sophisticated attacks. Since then it has only managed to carry out small scale 
assignation style attacks against soft targets such as bloggers and liberal scholars. 
Further since the end of 2014 it has only been able to launch attacks in Bangladesh. We 
can speculate that the early targeting of the AQIS leadership by drone strikes may have 
decapitated its command structure and hindered its development, although not quite 
managed to have strangle it at birth. 
 
Recent arrests of AQIS leadership figures in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, as well as 
the raids on AQIS training camps in Afghanistan, will have dealt a serious blow and kept 
up the pressure on the organisation. However, they also demonstrate that the group is 
not dead, and has been developing its network across South Asia. At first glance the lack 
of successful action has led many to argue that AQIS is of limited threat.  Although it is 
clear, that despite early setbacks, the group has not been eliminated and continues to 
organise and plan for the future. So far security forces across South Asia have managed 
to effectively disrupt the group’s activities, but the threat still remains. It is hard to 
predict what the future has in hold for AQIS, whether it remains the dog that didn’t bark, 
or whether it emerges to pose a major threat to South Asia. However, there are four key 
dynamics that are likely to determine its future: 
 
The first, is the outcome of the AQIS vs. ISIS rivalry in South Asia. There is the very real 
possibility that the with the rise of ISIS, AQIS may struggle to prove its relevance, and 
struggle to survive in the face of its more extreme young rival. Similarly, in may induce 
a period of in fighting amongst Jihadist groups in the region, or be the catalyst to drive 
AQIS to attempt a series of terrorist spectaculars to prove its worth. 
 
Second, the situation in Afghanistan following the U.S. draw down will have a direct 
impact on AQIS. If the current instability and resurgence of the Taliban continue, AQIS 
may well be able to exploit the situation to establish safe havens in Afghanistan from 
which it can operate. Allowing it to grow and develop, and provide it with the bases from 
which to launch its campaign of terrorism across South Asia. In many ways reverting to 
the pre-2001 situation in which safe havens in Afghanistan allowed al Qaeda to flourish 
and launch attacks on the west. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
Third, how well AQIS is able to connect the global with the local. The group’s model is 
based on collaborating with and absorbing local Jihadists groups across South Asia into 
its cause. As it has sought to do successfully elsewhere around the world, co-opting local 
groups into its global jihad. Attacks in Bangladesh, as well arrests in both Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and India, have shown that AQIS is operating with local groups. Will AQIS be 
able to act as a force multiplier, and share with these groups its tactical and operational 
experience, as well as acting as a source of funding, to enable these groups to launch 
more sophisticated and deadly attacks? 
 
Finally, whether AQIS is able to arise the call of Jihad within India’s Muslim population. 
So far India’s Muslim population has seemed largely been immune to the appeal of 
Jihadists groups, with most Jihadist attacks being carried out by foreign based 
organisations. However, India remains central to AQIS’s strategy and narrative, and if it 
manages to do what no jihadist group has managed to do before it, it will have big 
repercussions for both the world’s largest democracy, and the region. The distrust of 
current Prime Minister by large parts of the Muslim population, and existing conflicts 
within India, it hopes will give it the scope to construct a convincing narrative. Although 
it’s chances of success seem distant.102
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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